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Origins: The Courts of Westminster
Hall in the Eighteenth Century
DOUGLAS HAY

The Nova Scotia Supreme Court of 1754 was modelled on the ancient
common law courts in Westminster Hall.1 That great gothic building
was the heart of legal London. Originally completed in 1099 and
remodelled about 1400, it was the seat of royal justice, and of all the
procedural and substantive elements of both the common law and the
principles of equity. The common law courts of King's Bench, Common
Pleas, and Exchequer coalesced as separate entities out of the early
medieval curia regis, the administrative household of the King, or perhaps its exchequer, in a protracted process from the twelfth to fourteenth centuries. The parchment rolls of Common Pleas and King's
Bench survive from the end of the twelfth century, are separate by 1232,
and exist in continuous runs from the third quarter of the thirteenth
century.2 The Court of Exchequer was the last of the three common law
courts to gel, out of the revenue exchequer; each of these courts had
only four justices (barons in the case of Exchequer) in the eighteenth
century. Chancery emerged out of the royal secretariat into a separate
court with its own 'law,' equity, in the fifteenth century. By the mideighteenth century, under the influence of Lord Chancellors Nottingham (1674-82) and Hardwicke (1737-56), and of fuller reporting, equity
had hardened into almost as fixed a set of remedies as those of the common law, the defects of which it allegedly supplied. This chapter is not,
however, about doctrine, although the decisions of their English brethren necessarily concerned the judges of Nova Scotia. The meaning of
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English 'high law' in the eighteenth century also resided in its procedure, patterns of litigation, the character of the bar and the benches,
and how they were regarded by those outside Westminster Hall. 3
Half a millenium of Westminster law was a revered inheritance for
wealthy and many less propertied English citizens, particularly in its
constitutional aspects, but the eighteenth century was also a period of
vociferous criticism of the central royal courts for delay, arcane procedures, and the host of fees demanded by counsel, officers, and judges.
The Hall itself was badly in need of renovation. In 1734 the courts,
divided up by board partitions as they were in earlier centuries, were
described as 'slovenly' in appearance; in the winter of 1739-40 tarpaulins were strung up to prevent rain from soaking Chancery and King's
Bench. The roof was found to be so weak that timbers were put in
place to shore it up. They remained there for eight years, until 1748,
when the judges complained to the Board of Works that the props
were 'an indecent sight in a Room where all the Courts of Justice sit,
and which is the access to both Houses of Parliament.'4 Meanwhile
Chancery and King's Bench were hidden behind a Gothic screen
designed by William Kent, and improved in appearance. But the hall
was still freezing cold in winter, and Hilary and Michaelmas terms
were often misery, until in 1755 the screen was doubled in height and
the courts covered over, just below the angels on the magnificent
medieval hammerbeam roof. 5
In 1754 Sir Dudley Ryder became lord chief justice, but the early
years of the Nova Scotia court coincided largely with the chief justiceship of the most famous judge of the century, William Murray, Earl of
Mansfield. From the time he took his seat in King's Bench in 1756, in
the southeast corner of the hall, the growing ascendency of that court
over Common Pleas accelerated. King's Bench was the greatest common law court, in any case: appeals ran to it from Common Pleas, and
it controlled the process of inferior courts through the prerogative
writs, notably those of certiorari and habeas corpus.6 By the former all
proceedings in a lower court could be removed into King's Bench; by
the latter, in which the writ had been improved upon by the statute of
1679, all those imprisoned in other jurisdictions (or by private persons)
were brought before the judges to have the matter tested. The fact that
King's Bench was open to all barristers, whereas Common Pleas was
monopolized by the dying breed of serjeants-at-law, increased the
popularity of Mansfield's court. His reign there, until the late 1780s,
also coincided with the celebration of the genius of the common law in
William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England (given as lee-
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tures from 1753, first edition 1765-g). Mansfield made suggestions
about the text, and Blackstone became briefly a puisne justice of King's
Bench in 1770, before moving to Common Pleas later that year. In both
the Hall and the law, the third quarter of the eighteenth century was
thus a period of some new doctrine, procedural reform, architectural
improvement, and a great deal of self-congratulation. The best-known
legal innovations were in King's Bench. Mansfield blurred, in the eyes
of many lawyers, the boundaries of equity and common law, and he
influenced Blackstone's account in a similar way.7 He also curbed
some practices of the clerks, and simplified some process. But these
were minor changes in a matrix of rules, forms of process, and daily
practices that we now know were being elaborated and complicated in
the other courts (notably Chancery), and even in King's Bench, in a
manner richly rewarding to judges and lawyers and clerks.8
By the later eighteenth century Chancery practice was the most remunerative in the Hall. More lawyers made at least some appearances
there, than they did in any other court.9 Chancery sat in the southwest
corner of the Hall, across from King's Bench in the southeast corner, and
many suffering litigants sent back and forth between common law and
equity in the course of a single lawsuit damned them both. But they did
not think (as nineteenth-century reformers did) that putting both remedies in one court was a sure solution. In the one eighteenth-century
court with both an equity and common law side, Exchequer, it was not
the litigants but the specialized practitioners familiar with its obscure
and unique procedures who benefited from this convenience. 1 0 Such
procedures were revered by the profession, and expressions of reverence for the certitude and antiquity of the common law are often inseparable from professional appreciation of the complexity and expense of
its process. Many eighteenth-century common lawyers distrusted
Mansfield's very minor changes to the law: James Boswell, although a
Scot from a different legal tradition, greeted Lord Kenyon, Mansfield's
successor, as 'a good fuller's mill to thicken and consolidate the law,
which was very necessary after the loose texture which Lord Mansfield
had given it.' 11 Particularly during the period of the French and revolutionary wars (1792-1815), which began shortly after Mansfield's retirement, tradition rather than innovation was the dominant value in the
highest circles of government and law. Lord Kenyon (CJKB 1788- 1802)
and other judges made frequent reference to the antiquity and hence
wisdom of the common law, and the necessity to maintain it inviolate,
fixed, safe from statutory incursions, and distinct from equity. 12 From a
layman's point of view, innovation seemed to be limited to an ever-
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increasing and costly complexity in litigation, growing throughout the
century. It was only in the 1830s and 1840s that the judges' patronage
positions were finally bought out and they were put entirely on salary,
and the prolonged process of simplifying pleadings and unnecessary
charges began. Until then both the law and Westminster Hall itself continued to attract much criticism. The young John Beverley Robinson,
later chief justice of Upper Canada, visiting the Hall in 1815, thought
'everything about it seems to be tumbling into ruin- the first impression
it occasions is melancholy and gloomy ... ' 1 3 This was also the mood of
many litigants.
Civil Litigation
Most civil litigation in England took place in borough and a few surviving county and hundred courts dating from the Middle Ages, in
statutory courts of request, and in other inferior tribunals with or without juries. The borough courts of record were based on common law
process, increasingly so from the early seventeenth century;.courts of
request, most of them the result of eighteenth-century legislation, were
held by lay commissioners using broad equitable powers.14 Such proceedings were usually fairly quick, inexpensive, and informal: the
courts of request in particular were extremely effective venues for
enforcing payment of small debts. In contrast, litigation at Westminster was procedurally complex and very expensive, requiring much
professional consultation. At common law, the ancient forms of action
determined pleadings before simplification began in the 183os.1 5 Each
was based on a different writ, and the respective procedure and proofs
were distinctive and extremely technical. Actions were real (for land),
personal, or mixed. Real actions were displaced by ejectment. Personal
actions were on contract or tort. The former comprised assumpsit (on a
simple contract), debt (on a deed or on a simple contract), covenant (on
deed alone), scire facias (on a judgment), account, and annuity. The
actions in tort were trespass (of two sorts, one on real property, one on
goods), case (which had become a general category in the absence of a
more appropriate form of action), replevin (to recover goods unlawfully taken), trover (to recover the value of such goods), and detinue
(to re.c over the gbods, or their value, and damages.)
The crucial importance of choosing the right action to fit the circumstances of the case (a wrong choice was usually fatal), the fact that no
two could be joined in one suit, and the costly learning of special plead-
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ers, increasingly employed from mid-century, to winnow the case
between the parbes down to a limited issue gave the professionals virtually total control of litigation. 16 Once embarl<ed on a suit, plaintiffs
found themselves led by attorneys, solicitors, barristers, court officers,
. and judges, all of whom benefited from a series of procedural tollgates,
many of them wholly unnecessary. A plaintiff seeking judgment on a

debt could be forced to pay at some forty separate stages, most of them
pretrial.17 Counsel on both sides exploited the fact that the four terms of
the judicial year (Hilary, Easter, Trinity, and Michaelmas), within which
most motions had to be made, were each of only three to five weeks'
duration; in each term, specified return days and other rules required
close attention by clerks in court, attorneys, and counsel if an action was
to succeed. Given these obstacles, what made a lawsuit worthwhile,
particularly in debt collection (which-constituted Bo per cent of the work
of the common law courts, in both Westminster and Nova Scotia) was
the high rate of success for plaintiffs with good evidence, and the payment of costs by the loser. The rolls of the courts were also used extensively to provide security for debts at the time credit was extended, or
if doubts arose, through the use of cognovits and warrants of attorney.
By agreeing to sign them, the debtor guaranteed the creditor speedy
and uncomplicated collection in case of eventual default.
These various advantages accounted for a significant caseload in the
central courts of ·the common law. In the case of King's Bench, the original jurisdiction of the court in Middlesex, extended to out-counties
through the fiction of the Bill of Middlesex, was the basis of an increasing dominance over Common Pleas and Exchequer by the eighteenth
century. Estimates based on the various entries made by the clerks
suggest that over 11,000 suits were begun annually in King's Bench at
mid-century; the vast majority of course never proceeded to trial. The
distribution of business shifted over. time, however. Common Pleas
cases dropped from perhaps 16,000 in 1740 to fewer than 6,ooo in 1765.
Probably something over 1,000 cases began in Exchequer each year.
King's Bench was to become by far the dominant court in the later
eighteenth century, as Common Pleas had been in the seventeenth.
The Mid-Century Trough
In spite of procedural and substantive innovations, particularly by
Mansfield (in the use of special juries; in insurance; in commercial
law), the central common law courts dealt with far less litigation than
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they had a hundred years before or were to see a hundred years later.
For centuries the courts had vied among themselves for business, trying to attract litigants with speedier or more convenient process. The
Bill of Middlesex and writ of latitat in King's Bench and the elaboration
of assumpsit were the two main earlier innovations which led eventually, from about 1750, to the domination of civil suits by King's
Bench. 18 But this was a division of a litigation pie that was only a sixth
the size of that a century earlier: cases in an advanced stage in the two
principal.courts, King's Bench and Common.Pleas, which numbered
about 30,000 in the mid-seventeenth century, amounted to only about
5,000 in 1750, rising to about 10,000 in 1800. Trials, most of which took
place outside London at county assizes, in the nisi prius court, had
declined by the early eighteenth century to a quarter of their level at
the Restoration.1 9 This enormous decline in litigation was largely mirrored in the records of other, inferior, and local courts.20 Only in the
nineteenth century did litigation levels again reach those of the early
seventeenth.
A number of explanations have been offered for the earlier rise of
the litigation wave to its Elizabethan height;2 1 they are difficult to disentangle but the results affected all courts. There is a growing consensus in the literature that the subsequent precipitous decline from about
the Restoration had fewer and more obvious causes. Stamp duties at
the end of the seventeenth century contributed, as did perhaps the
growth in the use of penal bonds, but the most important determinant
was probably the greatly increased expense of litigation in the hands of
the small but entrenched legal fraternity of attorneys, solicitors, barristers, and judges through the seventeenth and into the eighteenth century. Even in inferior local courts, fees increased markedly over the
period of the great litigation decline. In Westminster Hall, fees were
much higher in the mid-eighteenth century than they had been a century before, and all the lawyers shared in them. 22 Among the greatest
beneficiaries were the judges themselves. They controlled immense
patronage in the chief clerkships and other important positions in their
courts, which they usually granted to their sons and other male dependents; they shared fees from virtually every case and stage of process,
directly or indirectly; and they therefore had no incentive at all to
attack the cost of law at Westminster. 2 3
The profits of the law derived mainly from attracting plaintiffs to
Westminster and then milking the defendants. The average cost of the
most common kind of proceeding, debt collection, was six or seven
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times as great as the amount at issue. This could only be attractive to
plaintiffs with strong evidence (such as a bond or other sealed instrument), who could be sure of success and who 'given the rule that the
loser paid all costs, were themselves immune from the expense and
possibly gratified by the burden on the defendant. Quantitative study
of the court records has shown that this was in fact the typical case: for
collection of a debt, with a high success rate by plaintiffs, both in pretrial proceedings and in the small proportion of cases that actually
went to trial. 24
Some trials were held 'in bane,' before the judges at Westminster,
but the great majority of civil cases were tried by nisi prius juries summoned in the counties in which the action arose. The common law
judges on circuit were called justices of assize, after the name of one of
the commissions by which they acted. They travelled in pairs, as they
generally did in Nova Scotia before 1834, usually twice a year to most
counties, throughout the countty. Assizes were held in the vacations
following Hilary and Trinity terms, and at each assize town one judge
held the Crown court for criminal cases, the other the nisi prius court,
sometimes relieving each other when one calendar was unusually
long. The relative proportions of civil and criminal litigation in the
high courts have not been examined in any detail, but an initial distinction is important. At nisi prius were heard not only all civil suits
brought to trial, but also a few misdemeanours that had been removed
into King's Bench by writ of certiorari from quarter sessions or even an
earlier Crown case at assizes, and also criminal informations laid in
King's Bench. In one county, Staffordshire, 195 civil cases at Westminster were entered for trial in the county at nisi prius between 1784 and
1791; in the same period, only one criminal proceeding (on an indictment removed by certiorari) - half of 1 per cent-was so entered.2 5 Of
the 155 of these cases that actually proceeded to trial at nisi prius, 54.8
per cent were case (assumpsit), 18.1 per cent ejectment, 10.3 per cent
debt, 7.1 per cent trespass, 5.2 per cent assault, 2.6 per cent covenant,
and o.6 per cent of each of replevin, trover, and criminal on certiorari.26
After the outcome of the trial was returned to Westminster Hall in a
formal statement called a postea, judgment was pronounced there.
There could, however, be motions in error (a writ of error in a criminal
case) or for arrest of judgment or a new trial, argued at Westminster; if
the last was successful, the process began again, with a new trial in the
county of origin or (in the rare case of a change of venue) in another
county or in Westminster Hall itself.2 7
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Assizes brought Westminster to the provinces by means not only of
the pomp of javelin men (who met the judges at the county boundary),
the opening church service, and the practised rhetoric of death sentences, but also through the charge to grand jurors28 and a host of
informal exchanges between local gentry and officials and the judges
and barristers who had arrived in town by coach and on horseback.
The judges announced government policy and royal proclamations,
denounced sedition, drew attention to new statutes, took advice on
pardons, and exhorted magistrates and gave·them legal advice in the
few days in which they also cleared the gaols, heard important misdemeanour cases, and listened to counsel (including the leaders of the
bar, who came with them on circuit) argue their cases before the nisi
prius and Crown court juries. 29
Criminal
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Civil suits could be initiated, as we have seen, in any of the three common law courts at Westminster, to be heard by the judge there in term
time (in bane), or before the nisi prius judge at assizes.3° Criminal trials
were also heard by all the common-law judges, but in two quite different ways. Best known was their role in presiding at the trial of serious
criminal offences in the Crown court at assizes in the provinces, and in
rough rotation at the Old Bailey in London, where high court judges
sat with the recorder and aldermen.31 In these settings the eighteenthcentury judges heard a large proportion of indictable offences. Noncapital cases were in the jurisdiction of magistrates at quarter sessions,
but the small number of prosecutions in the eighteenth century
allowed the judges to try many lesser felonies and misdemeanours as
well, as did the Nova Scotia Supreme Court for decades after its founding. Thus, in the populous midland county of Staffordshire, the judges
at assizes heard about 69 per cent of all criminal trials between 1740
and 1800, while the county bench of magistrates at quarter sessions
heard only 31 per cent.32 Quarter sessions was preoccupied with local
government; assize judges knew the criminal law.
In term time, apart from occasional service at the Old Bailey, the only
judges concerned with criminal cases were the lord chief justice and the
three puisne justices who sat with him in King's Bench, the supreme
co~rt of criminal law. The criminal proceedings with which they dealt
(often making new law in so doing) fell into several categories. They
had an original jurisdiction in Middlesex, and therefore heard and
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determined many misdemeanours, often quite minor ones, prosecuted
on indictment in that county. 33 For Middlesex and for the rest of the
country, referred to in King's Bench records as the 'out-counties,' the
court dealt with indictments removed on certiorari from quarter sessions or assizes; there were also summary convictions before magistrates removed on certiorari; criminal informations filed ex officio by
the attorney general; other criminal informations filed by the master of
the Crown Office on behalf of private litigants; qui tam proceedings;
and proceedings by writ of habeas corpus, which of course were important in civil as well as criminal litigation. 34
Criminal informations, both ex officio and ordinary ones, were important weapons for both the government and private citizens, making the
prosecution of a misdemeanour expensive and speedy and removing
the grand jury oversight requisite in prosecutions on indictment. Ex officio informations were exhibited as of right by the attorney general, but
'or4inary' criminal informations required the approbation of the judges
before they could be exhibited (that is, become formal charges equivalent to an indictment); the tests that the judges applied changed over
time and became an important source of law. A particular version of a
criminal information, and the use of certiorari for removing, questioning, and quashing summary convictions, have been celebrated by older
histories as the main instruments by which King's Bench supervised,
controlled, and punished the misbehaviour of that great mass of inferior
magistrates throughout the country, the county justices of the peace and
borough justices. Based on an examination of every such case in one
county for the second half of the century, my own recent conclusion is
that in fact the control exerted by King's Bench was slight, hesitant, and
indeed virtually non-existent for much of the country. The simple reason
was that if magistrates were punished, even for egregious misbehaviour, it would be difficult to find men willing to take the post. 35 The high
court judges were therefore solicitous of magistrates, since most of the
work of the criminal law (supervising constables, taking bail, committing for trial, hearing summary cases) was carried out by these unpaid
inferior justices.
Attorneys, Solicitors, Barristers, and Clerks
The history of Westminster Hall is also the history of the complex
bureaucracies of the courts, and of attorneys and solicitors and the special pleaders who were said to work 'under the bar,' as well as of the
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barristers, serjeants, King's counsel, law officers of the Crown, and
judges who were its most visible performers. There were also other,
less noticed men: recent work on King's Bench, particularly the original jurisdiction of the court in Middlesex, shows that 'low attorneys,'
many of them men with no formal legal qualifications whatsoever,
offered their services on a contingent fee basis to even quite poor people. 36 It is obvious too that perjured witnesses, particularly in criminal
trials, were quite freely available for payment. But for most plaintiffs
and defendants, the services of qualified legal professionals were absolutely necessary, and their fees an inevitable concomitant of 'moving
the court.' Here the clerks of court were as important as the lawyers.
The fullest recent account of the role of the court bureaucracies and
the bar in Westminster Hall in the eighteenth century is a damning one.
The great litigation decline in England, which reached its nadir at the
moment of the founding of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court, seems
largely attributable to the increased cost and complexity of going to law
in the preceding century. The response of the bar (and of the clerks of
court) in the eighteenth was, David Lemmings shows, to serve an·
increasingly wealthy clientele, largely the London plutocracy, as gentry
in the provinces, and lesser citizens, withdrew from litigation. Those
able to pay for law were now made to pay much more, and technicalities, unnecessary motions and filings, the employment of multiple
counsel, and (a point he does not mention) an increased tendency to
argue cases on repeated occasions over a number of terms before judgment all greatly expanded opportunities for making fortunes at the bar.
The greatest legal and judicial fortunes were amassed between the
1750s and the early nineteenth century. The winners made spectacular
amounts of money and acquired peerages. The losers, including Jonathan Belcher, sought success in lesser places like Dublin and Halifax.
The result, argues Lemmings, was a pronounced and deserved erosion
of the place of the common law in the life of the community, the constitution, and public esteem. Only the role of a defence bar, in state trials
of great constitutional significance, somewhat redeemed the profession
and the courts.37
Judges and Politics and Law
Blackstone and other contemporary celebrants of the glory of English
law contrasted the courts of Westminster Hall with the despotic power
of Star Chamber and the other conciliar courts abolished in the 1640s.
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They lauded the learned probity of the Hanoverian bench, whose independence from the whims of the Crown, guaranteed by a few words in
the Act of Settlement (1701), they argued had ended the corruption
and ignorance manifested by the Stuart judges of the later seventeenth
century. This achievement was in fact the culmination of a half-century
of higher exrectations of probity, and constitutional independence, of
the judges. J Yet the claim of judicial independence in the eighteenth
century must be substantially qualified. Of course, the chancellor sat in
his court in Westminster Hall, in the House of Lords as principal representative of the government, and in Cabinet; his brother, the Master of
the Rolls, could and often did hold a Commons seat, a great convenience to the administration. But several historians have also pointed
out that both the notion of independence from political pressure and
innocence of other forms of interest were weak because of more general structural characteristics of the bar and bench. Wilfrid Prest argues
that gifts and other improper inducements were virtually unknown by
the eighteenth century, as judicial salaries and public expectations of
probity increased. 39 At the same time, however, judges continued to
give advice to private litigants, and, as we have seen, controlled large
patronage networks in their courts and profited directly from fees. The
attack on legal delay and costs therefore directly implicated them, particularly as the chief justices almost always appointed their immediate
family members to the immensely profitable leading clerkships in the
courts, the duties of which were all performed by low-paid deputies.
Most important, in the 1760s and 1790s the judges were identified by
critics of government as the creatures of the administration, the charge
that had been so incendiary under the late Stuarts. From the mid-176os
the Wilkites accused the bench of subverting the rights of jurors in
seditious libel cases, and of carrying the malign purposes of the government directly from the council chamber to the seat of justice, notably when Lord Chief Justice Mansfield sat simultaneously in Cabinet
and on King's Bench, first from 1757 to 176o in the administration of
Newcastle and Pitt; he remained an active privy counsellor for almost
eight years altogether.4° Judicial independence from royal and ministerial pressure was compromised as well because appointment to the
bench, and notably to the chief justiceships, almost always required
prior loyal service as a law officer of the Crown in Parliament. 41 Mansfield's stint in Cabinet, briefly as chancellor of the Exchequer from
April 1757, then without office until April 1763, when he resigned from
Cabinet with Bute's administration, was an unusually open acknowl-
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edgment of the well-understood political significance of the chief justices. 42 As a member of the House of Lords, and as an adviser to the
King and Cabinet, he defended government policy towards the American colonists and other burning issues. He also drafted legislation and
sponsored it in the Lords while chief justice, a practice not challenged
until the nineteenth century.43
If the chief justices were political (and Mansfield's role at the heart of
government is matched by Hardwicke's, even before he was chancellor),
they were occasionally on opposite sides of important issues. Perhaps
the clearest example is the enmity of Chief Justice Charles Pratt of Common Pleas (later Lord Camden), whose tenure there in 1762-6 overlapped with the early years of Mansfield's reign in King's Bench. In the
huge constitutional controversies aroused and sustained by John Wilkes
and his supporters, Pratt was heavily engaged on the side of the critics
of government and showered with gifts and testimonials for his opposition to the administration and to Mansfield. He WflS widely believed to
have shared in the writing of one of the most vitriolic published attacks
on Mansfield.44 But Camden, who continued to agitate on constitutional
issues long after he left the bench, and indeed until the end of his life (in
1792, supporting the Libel Act), was an exception. By the end of the century, in the state trials of Jacobins, popular supporters of the French revolution and advocates of democracy, it was Thomas Erskine and other
defence counsel who persuaded jurors to acquit. The judges, in contrast,
resisted all arguments that seditious libel was not theirs to define and
deplored the lack of convictions. In the early nineteenth century, judges
like Simon LeBlanc (JKB 179g-1816) and Alexander Thomson (B 17841814, CB 1814- 17) were handpicked by government to ensure that large
numbers of death sentences were passed and carried out on Luddites;
some other members of the bench had been too lenient.45 The chief justices and lord chancellors remained the staunchest sup'p orters of the
death penalty in England until the 1830s.
This fact is one of the many which distinguished the role of the high
court judges in England from those in Nova Scotia. The comparisons
that arise in the chapters of this book are many, and suggestive, although
any overall comparison must be a complex one. In Nova Scotia, legislation had done more than in any other British North American colony to
ameliorate the capital code, a source of satisfaction and pride to men like
Beamish Murdoch.46 Although colonial judges were important men, sitting in executive and legislative councils, they arguably never enjoyed
the political dominance of their English brethren. Nor, it appears from
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the immensely interesting research now in progress, was high law in
Nova Scotia ever as extortionate, plutocratic, and complacent as it was
in the courts of Westminster Hall. Moreover, other British high courts
· probably substantially influenced that of Nova Scotia, in ways now
being explored. The American-born Jonathan Belcher's experience was
gained mostly in Dublin, and in spite of the constitutional dominance of
the English high courts, and the intimate connections and advice
between the English and Irish benches, the nature of justice in Ireland
wa.s distinctive in many ways. 47 Scotland's own common law, overlaid
and intermixed with civilian influences, was celebrated by its greatest
institutional writers in the eighteenth century and had not yet begun to
succumb to the English influences increasingly imposed on it by the legislature and the House of Lords in the nineteenth. The literature and the
learning of the Court of Session and the High Court of Justiciary came
with many Scots to the British colonies. The influences of both Ireland
and Scotland, probably less in doctrine than in practice and administration, invite further research. Much more, of course, is now known of the
continuing and distinctive influences from other parts of North America
on Nova Scotian legislation and practice, and its own indigenous spirit
of invention. But like all the colonies that became Canada, eighteenthcentury Nova Scotian judges looked, of constitutional necessity, and
often filial piety, to the courts of Wes tminster Hall. They were the font
and origin of both common law and equity.

NOTES
1 The restructuring of 1764 emphasized this fact. See Cahill and Phillips, this
volume.
2 P. Brand, The Making of the Common Law (London: Hambledon Press 1992),
94-6; J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal Histon;, 4th ed. (London:
Butterworths 2002).
3 On the gulf between the high law of the central courts and the law administered by inferior magistrates, see D. Hay, 'Legislation, Magistrates and
Judges: High Law and Low Law in England and the Empire,' in D. Lemmings, ed., The British and Their Laws in the Eighteenth Centun; (London:
Boydell and Brewer, forthcoming 2004).
4 HM. Colvin, J. Mordaunt Crook, K Downes, J. Newman, The Riston; of the
King's Works (London: HMSO 1976), 5:388.
5 Ibid., 5:390.
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6 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 121h ed. (London, 17935), 3:110, 130-2, 264. The other prerogative or extraordinary writs were
mandamus (to compel the performance of a duty), procedendo (from
Chancery, to compel an inferior court to proceed to judgment), quo warranto (to inquire by what authority an office was exercised), and prohibition (to restrain an inferior court within its jurisdiction). Prohibition in
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